We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combine a bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate’s risk-taking incentives depend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn is determined by the conglomerate’s liability...

The paper studies property insurance in Britain. It emphasises the following points. In the case of terrorism insurance the government decided to provide cost free stop loss insurance, to prevent the market from breaking down. When the country was hit by subsidence damages, the premiums and...

The Medicare program, which provides insurance coverage to the elderly in the United States, does not protect them fully against high out-of-pocket costs. For this reason private supplementary insurance, named Medigap, has been available to cover Medicare gaps. This paper studies how Medigap...

In the standard model for insurance demand, the risk is totally exogenous and the insurance premium is paid for out of riskless wealth. This model yields results that are mostly in contradiction to everyday observation and have been used to question the pertinence of expected utility theory on...

About one-third of elderly Americans age 65 and older supplements their Medicare health insurance in a private insurance market known as the ÒMedigapÓ market. Prices for Medigap policies vary widely, despite the fact that regulations enacted in 1992 standardized all Medigap policies, thereby...

This paper examines episodes of banking sector distress for a large sample of developed and developing countries, highlighting the experience of Japan. By a host of crietria, Japan appeared to be in a stronger position than most countries at the onset of banking problems -low inflation,...

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information when the market value of deposit insurance can be determined using Merton's (1977, 3-11) formula.

This paper provides a survey on optimal insurance when insurers and policy holdes have symmetric information about the distribution of potential damages. When transaction costs are proportional to transfers, we show that 1)there is at least one state of the world where no indemnity is paid, 2)...

This article examines, under the Dual Theory of Choice (Yaari (1987)), the classical results and their extensions on self-insurance, self-protection and market insurance obtained by Ehrlich and Becker (1972) under the expected utility hypothesis. In particular, background risk, non-reliability,...