In this paper, we develop and test a model of optimal incentive compensation that incorporates consideration for the role of both competition and cooperation among the firm's top executives. Our model highlights the effects of firm risk on the relative importance of cooperative versus...

Contracts are examined when outcomes depend on managers' choices as well as efforts. As the cost of effort shrinks relative to payoffs, the optimal contract converges to a linear payoff if the control space of the agent has full dimensionality, but not otherwise. Thus, when the agent can trade...

This paper shows that portfolio constraints have important implications for management compensation and performance evaluation. In particular, in the presence of portfolio constraints, allowing for benchmarking can be beneficial. Benchmark design arises as an alternative effort inducement...

This paper shows that portfolio constraints have important implications for management compensation and performance evaluation. Concretely, in the presence of portfolio constraints, allowing for benchmarking can be beneficial. Benchmark design arises as an alternative effort inducement mechanism...

This paper studies the incentive effect of linear performance-adjusted contracts in delegated portfolio management under a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. It is shown that a linear performance-based contract can provide incentives for the portfolio manager to work at acquiring private...

This paper shows that portfolio constraints have important implications for management compensation and performance evaluation. In particular, in the presence of portfolio constraints, allowing for benchmarking can be beneficial. Benchmark design arises as an alternative effort inducement...

This paper shows that portfolio constraints have important implications for management compensation and performance evaluation. In particular, in the presence of portfolio constraints, allowing for benchmarking can be bene…cial. Benchmark design arises as an alternative effort inducement...

It is widely believed that call options induce risk-taking behavior. However, Ross (2003) challenges this intuition by demonstrating the impossibility of inducing managers with arbitrary preferences to always act as if less risk averse. If preferences and price distributions are unknown,...

In this paper we examine intra-firm competition in the U.S. mutual fund industry. Our empirical study shows that fund managers within mutual fund families compete against other fund managers within the same fund family. They adjust the risk they take dependent on the relative position within...

Among the reactions to recent corporate scandals are calls for greater transparency of insiders' trades. The Securities and Exchange Commission's recent rule on fair disclosure is accompanied by a safe harbor from prosecution under insider trading laws for insiders who pre-commit to trades. A...