This paper analyzes central bank policies on the monitoring of banks in distress in which liquidity provisions are conditional on performance when a bad shock occurs. A sequential game model is used to analyze two policies: the first one in which the central bank acts with discretion and the...

This paper uses stochastic frontier analysis and Tobit regressions to provide international evidence on the impact of regulatory, supervision and environmental factors on bank efficiency. Our contribution is twofold. First, we use a newly constructed database of 3,086 observations from 677...

Understanding firm constraints in Ramp;D expenditures is a key component to addressing broader economic goals. We investigate the role of local intensity of university-industry knowledge spillovers on the amount of firm Ramp;D expenditure. To investigate this issue we use firm-level dataon...

We investigate the association between the regulatory and supervision framework and the acquisition likelihood in the Asian banking industry. The sample consists of 472 commercial banks operating in 9 South and Southeastern Asian countries, from which 52 were acquired between 1998 and 2004,...

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...

Bank mergers can increase or decrease loan spreads, depending on whether the increased market power outweighs efficiency gains. Using proprietary loan-level data for U.S. commercial banks, I find that, on average, mergers reduce loan spreads, with the magnitude of the reduction being larger when...

Call protection in debt contracts is ubiquitous in the bond market, customary in the commercial mortgage market, yet reviled and highly restricted in the residential mortgage market. We examine the reasons for these differences and use Monte Carlo techniques to calculate the economic value of...

The solution adopted in Basel II to deal with procyclicality of capital requirements (i.e. through the cycle ratings and long-run average estimates of default probabilities) implies a reduction in the risk-sensitivity that contradicts the original spirit of the new framework.In order to preserve...

This paper studies how institutional factors and systemic risks (driven by macroeconomic conditions) prevalent in emerging economies may impact market discipline among banks (traditionally understood as market responses to bank fundamentals). First, we discuss how certain institutional features...

The new Basel II regulation contains a number of new regulatory features. Most importantly, internal ratings will be given a central role in the evaluation of bank loans' riskiness. Another novelty is that retail credit and SME loans will receive a special treatment in recognition of the fact...