There has been a recent wave of PE firms that have gone public like Blackstone, Fortress, Apollo etc. Moreover, some firms like The Carlyle Group went through the private placement route by selling their shares to sovereign funds (personal wealth) of the people in the Middle East. Using a...

This paper considers the structure, governance and performance of a unique class of mutual funds that receives capital only from individuals, and reinvests this contributed capital in private companies, as opposed to traditional mutual funds that invest in publicly traded companies. We consider...

In this paper, we examine a Canadian tax-driven vehicle known as the Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporation (LSVCC). As a theoretical matter, we suggest that the LSVCCs can be expected to have higher agency costs and lower profitability than private venture capital funds. We present data...

This paper considers the issue of when venture capitalists (VCs) make a partial, as opposed to a full exit, for the full range of exit vehicles. A full exit for an IPO involves a sale of all of the venture capitalist's holdings within one year of the IPO; a partial exit involves sale of only...

Venture capital exit vehicles enable, to different degrees, mitigation of informational asymmetries and agency costs between the entrepreneurial venture and the new owners of the firm. Different exit vehicles also affect the amount of new capital for the entrepreneurial firm. Based on these...

This paper considers the structure, governance and performance of a unique class of mutual funds that receives capital only from individuals, and reinvests this contributed capital in private companies, as opposed to traditional mutual funds that invest in publicly traded companies. We consider...

In this paper, we examine a Canadian tax-driven venture capital vehicle known as the quot;Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporationquot; (LSVCC). As a theoretical matter, we suggest that the LSVCCs can be expected to have higher agency costs and lower profitability than private venture...

Private independent limited partnership venture capital funds receive capital from institutional investors, without tax incentives. Limited partnership investment activities are governed by restrictive covenants that are determined by negotiated contract between the fund managers (general...

This paper considers efficient venture capital investment duration for different types of entrepreneurial firms so that on exit information asymmetries between the venture capitalist (as seller) and the new owners of the investment are minimized, and capital gains maximized. We hypothesize that...

This paper examines cross-country evidence on the duration of venture capital (VC) investment. We formulate a theory of VC investment duration based on the idea that venture capitalists exit when the expected marginal cost of maintaining the investment is greater than the expected marginal...