We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function...

A growing body of literature suggests that because risk-averse executives are undiversified, they value equity compensation at significantly less (over 30%) than market value. This valuation discount is driven by the assumptions that the firm ignores existing incentives when it grants equity,...

We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function...

A growing body of literature suggests that because an executive is risk-averse and undiversified, he values equity compensation and incentives at less than market value. This discount on valuation is driven by the assumption that the executive is constrained from rebalancing his portfolio...

We examine the determinants of options outstanding, grants, and exercises by non-executive employees. Using hand-collected data on options outstanding, grants, and exercises for a broad cross-section of 795 large firms for the years 1994 to 1997, we create measures of option values and...

This paper investigates firm characteristics associated with the choice of individual versus group compensation schemes for senior executives below the CEO level. We define individual compensation schemes where senior executives are compensated independently from other senior executives, where...

We find that fixed effects related to the location of a firm's headquarters explain variation in broad based option grants after controlling for industry effects and firm characteristics traditionally known to affect option granting. Location matters because of local labor market conditions and...

Multiple-performance-measure agency models predict that optimal contracts should place greater reliance on performance measures that are more precise and more sensitive to the agent's effort. We apply these predictions to CEO retention decisions. First, we develop an agency model to motivate...

We study management turnover for the top five executives in a sample of 443 large firms from 1993 through 1998. The rate of forced turnover for non-CEOs is at least as great as that for CEOs, but the sensitivity of turnover to firm performance is smaller for non-CEOs. The probability that a...

We study the job movements of senior executives across firms. We find that executives who jump to CEO positions at new employers come from firms that exhibit above-average stock price performance. This relationship is more pronounced for more senior executives. No such relationship exists for...