Using a dynamic model of patent races for two sequential innovations, Scotchmer & Green (1990) compared the effect on R&D incentives of the two patent-issuing rules, first-to-invent and first-to-file, and found first-to-file more conducive to R&D. We show that their result depends on their...

This paper explores the linkage between protection and the speed with which a protected firm adopts new technology. Of primary importance here is the distinction between permanent and temporary protection on the one hand, and between tariffs and quotas on the other. The authors find that a...

In recent trade policy debates it is often argued that temporary protection stimulates innovation. This paper shows that the validity of the argument depends on the perceived credibility of protection policy. If it is suspected that temporary protection will be removed early should innovation...

With the America Invents Act of 2011, the U.S. changed its patent-issuing rule from first-to-invent to first-to-file, the international norm. We investigate the effect of such a policy change in a two-country model of R&D competition for two sequential (basic and final) inventions. We find that...