The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the management and economics literature. This study analyzes the structure of executive compensation in family and non-family firms. In line with predictions of agency theory, it is found that the share of base salary is...

This study examines the widespread belief that executive pay should reflect firm performance. We compile a hand-collected data set of compensation paid to executive directors of Dutch listed companies and analyze if executive compensation is indeed determined by firm performance. A variety of...

To motivate managers to pursue shareholder interests, boards may design management compensation packages to reward managers for good firm performance. However, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) note that when CEOs are far from retirement, they have career concerns. In these cases, Gibbons and Murphy...

Whether equity-based compensation and equity ownership aligns the interests of managers with stockholders is an important question in finance. Early studies found an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value, but later studies using firm fixed effects found no...

In this paper I examine the likelihood of CEO stock option repricing and its alternatives, namely option grant, stock grant, and do nothing. Multinomial logit results suggest that firms reprice options to increase sensitivity of pay to stock price and to temper down sensitivity of pay to...

Using a proprietary database for the largest 158 European companies during 1999-2004, I find that transparency of executive pay disclosures and sensitivity of executive pay to performance increase with the proportion of top executives serving as company directors and with dual CEO/board chairs....

This article, originally prepared as a Research Paper for Australian institutional investors (Australian Investment Managers' Association Research Paper #1/96), outlines a range of issues in contemporary debate on director and executive compensation, with particular focus on the importance of...

The problem of executive compensation was an underlying theme in international corporate scandals epitomized by Enron in the US, Parmalat and Vivendi in Europe, and One.Tel in Australia. There has been a wide array of regulatory responses to these scandals across jurisdictions, with varying...

The problem of executive compensation was an underlying theme in international corporate scandals epitomized by Enron in the US, Parmalat and Vivendi in Europe, and One.Tel in Australia. There has been a wide array of regulatory responses to these scandals across jurisdictions, with varying...

Agency theory suggests that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of CEO's compensation is an important motivation mechanism to the CEO to improve corporate performance. We develop a simple model that suggests that reverse causality should also be considered. Specifically, our model predicts...