This paper considers the relation between board classification, takeover activity, and transaction outcomes for a panel of firms between 1990 and 2002. Target board classification does not change the likelihood that a firm, once targeted, is ultimately acquired. Moreover, shareholders of targets...

We empirically investigate whether corporate governance structure is different between focused and diversified firms, and whether any differences in corporate governance are associated with the value loss from diversification. We find that, relative to focused firms, CEOs in diversified firms...

This paper provides large-sample evidence pertaining to the use of and wealth effects associated with provisions for termination fees in merger agreements between 1989 and 1998. The evidence suggests that target termination fee clauses are an efficient contracting device through which target...

We empirically investigate the relationship between corporate governance structure and diversification. Using a sample of 199 firms beginning in 1985 and following these firms through 1994, we examine 1) if governance structure is significantly different between focused and diversified firms; 2)...

We find that CEO compensation is less sensitive to stock-price performance the greater the extent of firm diversification. Our empirical evidence is consistent with a theory of managerial entrenchment as well as with a theory of optimal contracting between shareholders and managers. To...

This paper examines the shareholder wealth effects of bids by controlling shareholders seeking to acquire the remaining minority equity stake in a firm - deals commonly referred to as minority freeze-outs. Minority claimants in freeze-out offers receive an allocation of deal surplus at the bid...