We analyze firms' investment behavior, differentiating firms according to the cash flow levels they experience during their lifecycles. We consequently consider the firm as the basic unit and not firm-year observations. Firms with persistent positive cash flow show higher investment-cash flow...

This paper reproduces a survey - previously applied in two different Continents, North America and Europe - to inquire about cost of capital, capital budgeting, capital structure, and corporate governance. The survey utilized in this article is Graham amp; Harvey's survey ( 2001) and its...

As the oversight role of the corporate board in Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) expands, companies feel the need to fill a knowledge gap on effective risk governance practices.The concept of correlating risk management, governance, and strategy in an enterprise-wide structure first appeared in...

Having focused heavily on Sarbanes-Oxley requirements and more rigorous corporate governance and compliance standards, U.S. corporate boards are now beginning to assess their evolving role in providing oversight in the area of enterprise risk management (ERM).This paper documents how boards of...

We combine elements of the pecking order and trade-off theories of capital structure to develop a more powerful and empirically descriptive theory in which firms have low long-run leverage targets, debt issuances are temporary deviations from target to meet unanticipated capital needs, firms...

The neoclassical q-theory is a good start to understand the cross section of returns. Under constant return to scale, stock returns equal levered investment returns that are tied directly with characteristics. This equation generates the relations of average returns with book-to-market,...

We examine the impact of the agency conflicts of debt on firm financing decision. Consistent with the hypothesis that firm financing policy is determined by the tradeoff between the market for corporate control (takeover defenses) and managerial opportunism, we find that managerial equity...

We develop a dynamic multi-equation model where firms make financing and investment decisions jointly subject to the constraint that sources must equal uses of cash. We argue that static models of financial decisions produce inconsistent coefficient estimates and that models that do not...

We use a fully-specified neoclassical model augmented with costly external equity as a laboratory to study the relations between stock returns and equity financing decisions. Simulations show that the model can simultaneously and in many cases quantitatively reproduce: procyclical equity issuance;...

We show that the agency theory of overvalued equity (see Jensen, 2005) rather than investors' fixation on accruals explains the accrual anomaly, i.e., abnormal returns to an accrual trading strategy (see Sloan, 1996).Under the agency theory of overvalued equity, managers of overvalued firms are...