We examine warrant agreements and identify three provisions of these contracts that allow managers to time the raising of capital: the right to call the warrants, to extend the life of the warrants, and to lower the exercise price of the warrants. We argue that these provisions are costly yet...

We provide new evidence on the sequential financing explanation for the use of warrants. Consistent with sequential financing, capital spending starts increasing in the year of the call and peaks three years after the call. In addition, both equity and debt financing increase significantly in...

Managers can decide to reduce a warrant's exercise price. A reduction in exercise price can induce exercise (a conversion-forcing reduction) or not (a long-term reduction). Conversion-forcing firms show an abnormal return of -1.53% on the announcement day but they perform well over the three...

Managers can decide to reduce a warrant's exercise price. A reduction in exercise price can induce exercise (a conversion-forcing reduction) or not (a long-term reduction). Conversion-forcing firms show an abnormal return of -1.53% on the announcement day but they perform well over the three...

Recent theoretical models (e.g., Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino, 2004) predict an association between the book-to-market (BE/ME) ratio and operating leverage in the cross-section. Consistent with these models, we find a strong positive association between BE/ME and the degree of operating...

Calling firms experience increases in systematic business risk following conversion-forcing calls of convertible debt. The increases in business risk are sufficiently large to offset the reductions in financial risk coming from the reduction in financial leverage following the call. As a result,...

The model and simulations of Berk, Green, and Naik (BGN, 1999) suggest that exercise of growth options alters firm-specific characteristics such as firm size (MVE) and book-to-market ratio (B/M) commensurately with changes in systematic risk. Consistent with BGN, we show empirically that...