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Should a firm favor insiders (handicap outsiders) when selecting a CEO? One reason to do so is to take advantage of the contest to become CEO as a device for providing current incentives to employees. An important reason not to do so is that this can reduce the ability of future CEOs and, hence,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012735057
Firms tend to promote insiders to the CEO position rather than to hire outsiders. This paper explains this phenomenon by developing a framework in which firms value the incentive that the contest to become CEO provides to current employees, but also want the most able candidate (insider or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012787886
Using a data set containing more than 1,000 observations on CEO succession in large U.S. firms over the period 1974-1995, we examine empirically the choice between insiders and outsiders as CEO. We employ a theoretical framework in which firms value both the incentive that the contest to become...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012743402
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Should a firm favor insiders (handicap outsiders) when selecting a CEO? One reason to do so is to take advantage of the contest to become CEO as a device for providing current incentives to employees. An important reason not to do so is that this can reduce the ability of future CEOs and, hence,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802106
We argue that outsiders are handicapped in CEO successions to strengthen the incentive that the contest to become CEO provides inside candidates. Handicapping implies that a firm is more likely to pick an insider for the CEO position where insiders are more comparable to each other and less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802110
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If outside directors with backgrounds in politics and in law play a political role, they will be more important on the boards of firms for which politics matters more. We conduct three tests. First, for a sample of manufacturing firms, we find that politically experienced directors are more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012786982
A greater threat of takeover has two opposing effects on managerial compensation. The competition effect in the market for managers reduces compensation. The risk effect increases compensation by making managers' implicitly deferred compensation and firm-specific human capital less secure. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012790750