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Der Neid und die Gesellschaft
Schoeck, Helmut - 1971 - Vom Autor gekürzte u. bearb. Ausg.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004681011
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Neid und Eifersucht : die Herausforderung durch unangenehme Gefühle
Kast, Verena - 1996 - 2. Aufl.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004939574
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Ecologies of Preferences with Envy as an Antidote to Risk-Aversion in Bargaining
Bergman, Nitai; Bergman, Yaacov - Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University … - 2000
, positive offers are made, of which some are rejected with positive probability. Our theory yields new testable hypotheses. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596296
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Hierarchical Assignments: Stability and Fairness
Eriksson, Kimmo; Karlander, Johan; Öller, Lars-Erik - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1997
We study a simple model of the job market, where workers are assigned to employers. We specify conditions under which the market is hierarchical in a natural sense. For such hierarchies, we can state explicit values for the earnings in the worker-optimal and employer-optimal solutions. This is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649344
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To Give or Not To Give? Equity, Efficiency and Altruistic Behavior in a Survey-Based Experiment
Pelligra, V.; Stanca, L. - Centro Ricerche Nord Sud (CRENoS) - 2010
This paper presents the results of a survey-based experiment on the role of equity and efficiency for altruistic behavior. Using simple binary decisions for a representative pool of subjects, we find that both equity and efficiency are relevant for the decision to give. However, contrary to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784495
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Inequality aversion causes equal or unequal division in alternating-offer bargaining
Kohler, Stefan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
patient bargainers that exhibit similar degrees of inequality aversion. Inequality-averse bargainers may perceive envy if … of their degree of envy. If guilt is weak, then the agreed split is tilted away from the Rubinstein division towards a … more unequal split. Envy and weak guilt have opposite effects on the bargaining outcome, and envy has a greater marginal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108663
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Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining
Kohler, Stefan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by … still reach agreement in the first period and their bargaining shares increase in the strength of their own envy. As both … bargainers' envy diminishes, the agreed partition converges to the Rubinstein division. If equally patient bargaining parties …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112839
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Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods : A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule
Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2006
We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a government distributes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733727
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Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction
Hong, Chew Soo - 2006
This note studies the allocation of heterogeneous commodities to agents whose private values for combinations of these commodities are monotonic by inclusion. This setting can accommodate the presence of complementarity and substitutability among the heterogeneous commodities. By using induction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734163
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Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets
Wakayama, Takuma - 2009
This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720057