I model the capital-risk-profit relation in a simultaneous three-equation model. The results show no systematic relation between risk and profit which is consistent with the view that risk is chosen optimally. Taking this as given, the equilibrium relation between capital and profit depends on...

We define regulatory risk as any regulatory action that leads to an increase in the cost of capital for the regulated firm. In a general equilibrium setting the paper considers the impact of globally harmonising capital adequacy requirements on the cost of bank equity capital. The results show...

This paper investigates the relation between bank capital and profitability. To my knowledge, no previous paper has analysed this problem in a two-equation structural model. Contrary to what is reported with surprising frequency in this field of research, the results show no statistically...

The orthodox assumption in the banking literature is that capital requirements are a binding constraint on banking behavior. This is in conflict with the empirical observation that banks hold a buffer of capital well in excess of the minimum requirements. This paper develops a model where...

The orthodox assumption in the banking literature is that capital requirements are a binding constraint on banking behaviour. This is in conflict with the empirical observation that banks hold a bu¤er of capital well in excess of the minimum requirements. This paper develops a model where...

We document a positive association between political uncertainty and accounting conservatism. In the year prior to a U.S. presidential election, on average, accounting conservatism increases by nearly 20 percent. This election year effect is stronger when the election is closer, when the...

We examine changes to corporate ownership in nine East Asian countries following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Countries with lower incomes and in which policy making involves greater transactions costs (i.e., veto points) have more firms with state ownership. Partial state ownership appears...