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This paper reports an experiment that evaluates three regimes for triggering the conversion of contingent capital bonds into equity: (a) a “regulator” regime, where socially motivated regulators make conversion decisions based on observed prices, (b) a “fixed trigger” regime where a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008917672
"This paper reports an experiment conducted to evaluate a "near-continuous" variant of the posted offer trading institution, where the number of periods in a market session is increased by reducing sharply each period's maximum length. Experimental results suggest that although decisions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005024175
We report an experiment that evaluates three market-based regimes for triggering the conversion of contingent capital bonds into equity: a Òfixed-triggerÓ regime, where a price threshold triggers mandatory conversion, a ÒregulatorÓ regime, where regulators make conversion decisions based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009649576
Contests between groups of workers are often used to create incentives in organizations. Managers can sort workers into groups in various ways in order to maximize total output. We explore how the optimal sorting of workers by ability in such environments depends on the degree of effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263917
Group decision making provides a mechanism for channeling individual members' knowledge into productive organizational outcomes. However, in hidden profile experiments in which group members have common information favoring an inferior choice, with private information favoring a superior choice,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009214414
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This study tests whether individuals are reluctant to tell lies, or perhaps only “harmful lies”, in a previously untested environment: an expert sending a message to a decision maker whose interpretation of that message is subject to error, i.e. a noisy sender–receiver game. In the Aligned...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048190
We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2007</CitationRef>) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988969