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Mergers & Acquisitions : strategische und finanzielle Analyse von Unternehmensübernahmen

Huemer, Friedrich - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000822035

Do Shareholder Tender Agreements inform or expropriate shareholders?

Bargeron, Leonce L. - In: Journal of Corporate Finance 18 (2012) 2, pp. 373-388

By signing a Shareholder Tender Agreement (STA) a shareholder pre-commits to tender her shares to a particular bidder, forsaking the right to tender to any subsequent bidder. In a representative sample of tender offers between 1995 and 2010, 60% of the offers contain an STA. STA deals are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574242

Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives

Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - University of Bonn, Germany

information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that … high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074874

Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives

Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that …€”to obtain high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage. We derive conditions under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699423

Auctions vs. negotiations in takeovers with initial stakes

Loyola, Gino - In: Finance Research Letters 9 (2012) 3, pp. 111-120

Takeover attempts from raiders with prior stakes in the target company (toeholds) are frequent in the market for … procedure outperforms, in terms of expected target price, conventional auctions frequently used to model takeover battles …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010595312

The equal opportunity rule in transfer of control : a signaling model

de La Bruslerie, Hubert - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2009

The equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. In order to better analyze the consequence of such a rule, we need to account for the information asymmetry that exists between new controlling shareholders and outside investors with private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706677