This essay was written for a forthcoming festschrift in honor of my UCLA School of Law colleague, coauthor, and friend William A. Klein. The conference is organized around Bill's claim that corporate law scholarship would benefit if scholars were more explicit about the normative criteria that...

The collapse of Enron and WorldCom, along with only slightly less high profile scandals at numerous other U.S. corporations, has reinvigorated the debate over state regulation of corporate governance. Post-Enron, politicians and pundits called for federal regulation not just of the securities...

Prepared for a symposium on the role business and legal ethics played in the Enron, WorldCom, and other recent corporate governance scandals, and the relationship (if any) between business ethics and the legal profession's rules of professional responsibility, this paper examines the changes...

Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation by Harvard law professor Lucian Bebchuk and UC Berkeley law professor Jesse Fried is an important contribution to the literature on executive compensation. Bebchuk and Fried's positive account of executive compensation is...

The basic building blocks of post-privatization Slovenian corporate governance differ rather dramatically from those of the United States. Slovene corporations are characterized by highly concentrated ownership dominated by state-controlled funds and other institutional investors. In addition,...

Prepared for a festschrift in honor of Philip Selznick, this essay looks back at his 1969 book Law, Society, and Industrial Justice. The focus is on employee participation in corporate decisionmaking. Taking an interdisciplinary approach (law and sociology), Selznick treats employee involvement...

In his important book, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS, Professor Mark Roe questioned whether Berle and Means were correct in assuming that the separation of ownership and control is an inherent aspect of large public corporations. Roe contends that dispersed ownership was not the inevitable...

The default statutory model of corporate governance contemplates not a single hierarch but rather a multi-member body that acts collegially. Why? This article reviews evidence that group decisionmaking is often preferable to that of individuals, focusing on evidence that groups are particularly...

Insider trading likely is one of the most common forms of securities fraud, yet it remains one of the most controversial aspects of securities regulation among legal (and economic) scholars. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of both the law of insider trading and the contested...