Existing research on cross-country differences in ownership concentration analyzes country averages of ownership concentration instead of firm-level data. This creates omitted-variable and aggregation biases. Most papers also use small samples of large firms. This makes inferences to country...

The original cost regulatory system, as currently used in the regulation of utilities and natural gas pipelines, cannot emulate the response of a competitive firm to high and varying inflation. Although there can be many problems introduced by regulatory lag and by high administrative and...

We re-examine old evidence and provide new evidence on private placements of large-percentage blocks of stock. Our goal is to judge whether the prevailing hypotheses of monitoring and certification explain most private placements. Examining new evidence on events following the private placement...

This paper surveys the empirical literature on large-percentage shareholders in public corporations, focusing on four key issues: the prevalence of blockholders; the motivation for block ownership; the effect of blockholders on major corporate decisions, specifically executive compensation,...

It is widely held that for tax reasons corporate shareholders are the only shareholders that prefer dividends to capital gains. This has led to clientele models where corporate blockholders migrate to firms paying dividends and use their voting power to increase dividends in these firms. We use...

This paper offers evidence on the ownership concentration at a representative sample of U.S. public firms. 96% of these firms have blockholders; these blockholders in aggregate own an average 39% of the common stock. The ownership of U.S. firms is similar to and by some measures more...

Corporations uniquely have a tax preference for cash dividends. Nevertheless, dividends do not increase following trades of large-percentage blocks of stock from individuals to corporations. Moreover, although one-third of firms have corporate blockholders, 68% of these firms pay no dividends,...

We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly-traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership rises from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in...

This article offers evidence on the ownership concentration at a representative sample of U.S. public firms. Ninety-six percent of these firms have blockholders; these blockholders in aggregate own an average 39% of the common stock. The ownership of U.S. firms is similar to and by some measures...

Using a comprehensive database of American prisoners of war (POWs) during World War II, we find that survival from captivity generally declines as the hierarchy of a prisoner's group becomes steeper or more closely matches the military's established hierarchy. There is no evidence that survival...