This economic experiment tests the positive relationship between perceived intention and positive reciprocity by altering material-payoff structures in treatments, or material-payoff approach. To design the treatments, this study applies a signalling model to explain how the intention of an...

An exchange economy with asymmetrically  informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates  the information sharing among agents. For it, the notion of stable  sets à la Von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different  frameworks are taken into account as regards...

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidlerʼs (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive...

In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if...

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core...

We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow-Debreu economy.

We propose two generalizations of the Davis Maschler reduced game property to economies with asymmetric information and apply them in the characterization of two solution concepts. One is Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core and the other is a subsolution of it which we call the Coarse+ Core.

We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is...

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidlers (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive...

In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Herves-Beloso and Moreno-Garcia in [17], we establish a characterization of Walrasian...