This paper studies a competitive general equilibrium model with default and endogenous collateral constraints. Even though all collateralized contracts are allowed, the possibility and desirability of trade in spot markets (or the equivalent trade in ex ante asset backed securities) creates...

Suppose risk-averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm's cash flow risk by trading in financial markets, but cannot hedge their firm-specific exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm-specific projects in favor of standard projects that contain...

Suppose risk-averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm's cash flow risk by trading in financial markets, but cannot hedge their firm-specific exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm-specific projects in favor of standard projects that contain...

Assets that hedge against systematic shocks to the consumption distribution may carry a risk premium which aggregates differing preferences for redistribution. This paper explores that risk premium theoretically and empirically. Using a long time-series of U.S. income inequality, I find that...

This paper presents an equilibrium model for the demand and supply of liquidity and its impact on asset prices and welfare. We show that when constant market presence is costly, purely idiosyncratic shocks lead to endogenous demand of liquidity and large price deviations from fundamentals....

This paper articulates a logical foundation-drawn from disparate literatures-for understanding why safeguarding financial stability is an important economic policy objective. The paper also explains why private aspects of finance provide broader social economic benefits and have the...

A 'folk theorem' originating, among others, in the work of Stiglitz maintains that competitive equilibria are always or 'generically' inefficient (unless contracts directly specify consumption levels as in Prescott and Townsend, thus bypassing trading in anonymous markets). This paper critically...

This study investigates the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of economic agents in settings with incomplete contracts. We study the New York City taxi industry where taxis are often leased and lessee-drivers have worse driving outcomes than owner-drivers as a result of a moral...