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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102089

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109597

An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring

Abreu, Dilip; Sannikov, Yuliy - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2

Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains over the existing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019212

Do repeated game players detect patterns in opponents? Revisiting the Nyarko & Schotter belief elicitation experiment

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the seminal belief elicitation experiment by Nyarko and Schotter (2002) under the prism of pattern recognition. Instead of modeling elicited beliefs by a standard weighted ﬁctitious play model this paper proposes a generalized variant of ﬁctitious...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011947

Humans versus computer algorithms in repeated mixed strategy games

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

This paper is concerned with the modeling of strategic change in humans’ behavior when facing diﬀerent types of opponents. In order to implement this eﬃciently a mixed experimental setup was used where subjects played a game with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for 100 rounds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789888

Solving payoff sets of perfect public equilibria: an example

Du, Chuang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260559

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs

Miyagawa, Eiichi; Miyahara, Yasuyuki; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University - 2004

This paper studies repeated games with private monitoring where players make optimal decisions with respect to costly monitoring activities, just as they do with respect to stage-game actions. We consider the case where each player can observe other players' current-period actions accurately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385284

Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2005

coordination device. A player.s informational size associated with the public coordination device is the key to inducing truth … coordination device if she believes that her signal is likely to have a small impact on the public signal generated by the public … equilibrium in nearby private monitoring repeated games when the associated public coordination device, which makes private …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293082

Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty

Osório-Costa, António M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

This paper studies frequent monitoring in a simple infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length Δ. It shows that efficient strongly symmetric perfect public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837095

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001

For repeated games with noisy private monitoring and communication, we examine robustness of perfect public equilibrium/subgame perfect equilibrium when private monitoring is "close" to some public monitoring. Private monitoring is "close" to public monitoring if the private signals can generate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109614

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