We model strategic trading by a rent-seeking insider, who exchanges without being spotted, and propose a comprehensive theory of market non-anonymity. Several novel results are established. They depend on asset value proprieties, beliefs, inter-temporal choices, and investors' characteristics....

The major strand of finance literature understands market efficiency through the market's ability to process information into prices. Another strand of literature refers to the economists' usual sense of the word, i.e. that markets ensure that resources are allocated to their most profitable...

We investigate executive compensation and corporate governance in China's publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay...

This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic consequences of financial reporting and disclosure regulation. We integrate theoretical and empirical studies from accounting, economics, finance and law in order to contribute to the cross-fertilization of these fields....

This paper considers share repurchases as the way long-term shareholders preserve their ability to use corporate information for speculative purposes when insider trading regulation is enforced. This use of corporate information increases the adverse selection losses of short-term shareholders....

We investigate the backdating of stock option exercises. Before SOX, we find evidence that some exercises were backdated to days with low stock prices. Consistent with a tax-based incentive, these suspect exercises are more likely when the personal tax savings from backdating are higher....

Hundreds of articles have been written about various aspects of insider trading. It is one of those topics that is truly interdisciplinary, touching on finance, economics, law, business ethics and perhaps a few other disciplines. Yet with all this research there is still no consensus about when...

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of credit rating economics and draws conclusions on the nature of regulation. It starts with an overview of the credit rating industry and introduces a framework that structures multiple rating agency functions. At the heart of the credit rating...

We examine the extent to which economic incentives subject to political cost impact on accounting choice. We employ a setting with no agency factors to disguise economic incentives for earnings management. We find that profit firms manage earnings downward to reduce, but not entirely eliminate,...