English Abstract: We estimate systemic risk in the Korean economy using the econometric measures of commonality and connectedness applied to stock returns. To assess potential systemic risk concerns arising from the high concentration of the economy in large business groups and a few...

We use mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles. Using age as a proxy for managers' investment experience, we find that around the peak of the technology bubble, mutual funds run...

Models play an important role in strategic asset allocation (SAA), however by too much trust in the model stability, results are typically not so useful for practitioners. Professionals usually face the challenging problem of choosing a SAA model that matches their goals, bearing the operational...

Mutual fund portfolio decisions depend on previous trades of other funds with outstanding past performance: funds mimic the mutual fund industry leaders. Controlling for other factors, for each dollar leaders invest in a given stock, the follower funds invest 15 to 30 cents in the subsequent...

In an environment with stocks and short-term debt, random changes in the risk-reward frontier produce hedging demands for equities, implying that portfolio policies supporting optimal life-cycle consumption are rarely mean-variance efficient. Pursuing optimal life-cycle portfolio policies is...

We study the optimal consumption and portfolio choice problem over an individual's life-cycle taking into account annuity risk at retirement. Optimally, the investor allocates wealth at retirement to nominal, inflation-linked, and variable annuities and conditions this choice on the state of the...

Many college and university 403(b) plans restrict investment choices to the funds offered by TIAA-CREF, the current manager of over half of all 403(b) contributions. In the face of 2006 Internal Revenue Code changes some sponsors are dropping alternatives to TIAA-CREF. Using historical data, we...

We show that new managers who take over mutual fund portfolios typically proceed to sell off inherited momentum losers. They sell losers at higher rates than stocks in any other momentumdecile, even after adjusting for concurrent trades in these stocks by continuing fund managers. This behavior...

Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings through their characterizations of pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a...

Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings through their characterizations of pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a...