This paper studies how much information can be revealed when agents with private information lack commitment to actions in a given mechanism as well as to the mechanism itself. In a two-person decision problem, agents are allowed to hold on to an outcome in one mechanism while they play another...

This paper studies endogenous market formation in a ?nancial trading model where strategic traders face information asymmetries and aggregate shocks. First, we show that negative participation externalities can arise for a large class of assets. In a decentralized process of market formation,...

This paper proposes a new method for forecast selection from a pool of many forecasts. The method uses conditional information as proposed by Giacomini and White (2006). It also extends their pairwise switching method to a situation with many forecasts. I apply the method to the monthly...

This paper studies a rational expectations model of trading where strategic traders face information asymmetries and endowment shocks. We show that negative partici- pation externalities arise due to an endogenous interaction between information aggre-gation and multiple trading motives....

This paper proposes a new method for forecast selection from a pool of many forecasts. The method uses conditional information as proposed by Giacomini and White (2006). It also extends their pairwise switching method to a situation with many forecasts. I apply the method to the monthly...

In this paper, I propose a new method for forecast selection from a pool of many forecasts. My method has two features. The first is the use of the conditional predictive ability test proposed by Giacomini and White [2006]. Second, I construct a measure with two dimensions: "relative usefulness"...