We examine whether the compensation incentives of top management affect the extent of risk shifting versus risk management behavior in pension plans. We find that risk shifting through pension underfunding (and, to a lesser extent, through pension asset allocation to risky securities) is...

We show that managers increase the volume of public financial guidance in response to decreases in analyst coverage of their firms. This result is driven by the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period, and is stronger for firms with higher sales growth and firms with lower resulting levels of...

I examine the determinants and consequences of corporate pension plan investments in hedge funds and private equity, commonly referred to as ‘alternative assets’. I find that highly leveraged firms with low market-to-book ratios and volatile earnings performance are more likely to invest in...

The accounting profession in the United States recently shifted from self-regulation by peer review to statutory regulation by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Using this shift, I compare outcomes from self-regulation and statutory regulation for the same group of firms. I...