This paper builds on contributions to the Sloan conference Benefit-Cost Analysis of Financial Regulation, held at the University of Chicago, to show how benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of financial regulations should be conducted. Our major themes are that (1) on theoretical grounds, BCA should be...

We propose a general model of imperfect competition among multi-productfirms, the consumption of whose goods yields externalities from oneconsumer to another. We extend the allocation approach of Weyl (2010)'smonopoly model, proposing a solution concept, Insulated Equilibrium,that allows for...

Rochet and Tirole [Rochet, J.-C., Tirole, J., 2003. Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic Association 1(4), 990-1029] consider the consumer Ramsey problem in a model of two-sided markets. I extend their analysis to the social Ramsey and Lindahl problems,...

Holdout problems prevent private (voluntary and self-financing) assembly of complementary goods--such as land or dispersed spectrum--from many self-interested sellers. While mechanisms that fully respect sellers' property rights cannot alleviate these holdout problems, traditional solutions,...

I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. Platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocation. Profit maximization distorts in the spirit of A. Michael Spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users....

One of the most salient issues faced by platforms like newspapers and credit card issuers is that users are heterogeneous in the value they bring to other users or to the platform. We develop a model with multi-dimensional heterogeneity where a monopoly platform chooses (price or non-price)...

What is the best way to reward innovation? While prizes avoid deadweight loss, intellectual property (IP) selects high social surplus projects. Optimal innovation policy thus trades off the ex ante screening benefit and the ex post distortion. It solves a multidimensional screening problem in...

Using information local to the premerger equilibrium, we derive approximations of the expected changes in prices and welfare generated by a merger. We extend the pricing pressure approach of recent work to allow for non-Bertrand conduct, adjusting the diversion ratio and incorporating the change...

We extend five principles of tax incidence under perfect competition to a general model of imperfect competition. The principles cover (1) the independence of physical and economic incidence, the (2) qualitative and (3) quantitative manner in which taxes are split between consumers and...