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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008843687
We say that a social choice rule is implementable with (small) transfers if one can design a mechanism whose set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that specified by the rule but the mechanism allows for (small) ex post transfers among the players. We then show in private-value environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011252585
Barelli [P. Barelli, On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 144 (2009) 1320-1332] defines beliefs-determine-preferences (BDP) models and argues that BDP models are nongeneric in a topological sense. In this note, we point out some difficulties in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860926
Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817216
Due to the connections of energy uses, carbon emissions and climate, this study investigates the interactions, volatility spillovers, and long memory effects for carbon, oil, natural gas and coal markets by using FIEC-HYGARCH model. It also discusses the mediating effect of extreme weather. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719379
In this paper, we show that, in the class of games where each player’s strategy space is compact Hausdorff and each player’s payoff function is continuous and “concave-like,” rationalizability in a variety of general preference models yields the unique set of outcomes of iterated strict...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993599
The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049719
We prove that the structure theorem for rationalizability originally from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) applies to any finite extensive-form game with perfect recall and suitably rich payoffs. We demonstrate that the ties induced by the extensive form do not change the result of Weinstein and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049820
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