In this paper, we empirically identify rational overbidding using evidence from Hong Kong land auctions. In particular, we test for rational overbidding through a toehold effect in bidding behavior (Burkart (1995), Bulow, Huang and Klemperer, (1999)). In Hong Kong, auctions are widely used by...

Swedish bankruptcy filing automatically terminates CEO employment and triggers an auction of the firm. Critics of this system warn of excessive shareholder risk-shifting incentives prior to filing. We argue that private benefits of control induce managerial conservatism that may override...

I show that firms may optimally place their own equity with other firms in anticipation of possible future corporate control activity. In the model, a target and potential acquirer can negotiate before synergy values are learned. I find that equity implements an optimal mechanism, benefiting...

Target firms are often faced with bidders that are not equally well informed. This reduces the competition between the bidders, since a less well informed bidder fears the winner's curse more. We analyze how a target should optimally be sold in the presence of asymmetric bidders. We show that a...

Does valuation affect mergers? The data suggests that periods of stock merger activity are correlated with high market valuations. The naive explanation that overvalued bidders wish to use stock is incomplete because targets should not be eager to accept stock. However, we show that potential...

I study how possible future corporate control activity can influence equity sales between firms. In the model, a target and potential acquirer can trade a block of the target's equity before takeover values are learned. I find that a sale can benefit both firms at the expense of other potential...

This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain...

This paper demonstrates that winning a takeover bidding contest can be `bad news' and, consequently, losing can be `good news.' This result is true even when all bidders are acting rationally in their own best interests and have perfect information on their valuations. Bidders with toeholds...

We present unique empirical tests for overbidding using data from Sweden's auction bankruptcy system. The main creditor (a bank) can neither bid in the auction nor refuse to sell in order to support a minimum price. We argue that the bank may increase its expected revenue by financing a bidder...

This paper extends the corporate governance literature such as Alchian and Demsetz (1972) by analyzing the use of special committees of disinterested directors by target firms during corporate takeovers. Our sample spans post Sarbanes-Oxley from 2003 through 2007, under which boards of directors...