Showing 1 - 10 of 15,384
This paper considers the e effcts of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011128986
This paper analyzes repeated games in which it is possible for players to observe the other players' past actions without noise but it is costly. One's observation decision itself is not observable to the other players, and this private nature of monitoring activity makes it difficult to give...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005422893
This paper studies repeated games with private monitoring where players make optimal decisions with respect to costly monitoring activities, just as they do with respect to stage-game actions. We consider the case where each player can observe other players' current-period actions accurately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385284
In a repeated game with private information, a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) can break down if communication is not necessarily simultaneous or if players can “spy” on each others’ information. An ex post perfect public equilibrium (EPPPE) is a PPE that is ex post incentive compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407608
We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260559
We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049786
We study learning with bounded memory in zero-sum repeated games with one-sided incomplete information. The uninformed player has only a fixed number of memory states available. His strategy is to choose a transition rule from state to state, and an action rule, which is a map from each memory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931201
A repeated game with private monitoring is “close” to a repeated game with public monitoring (or perfect monitoring) when (i) the expected payoff structures are close and (ii) the informational structures are close in the sense that private signals in the private monitoring game can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043051
We apply a game-theoretic model to the analysis of the recent spate of corporate scandals in which firms have cheated their investors, often with the aid of external auditors. We characterize the different types of equilibria that obtain for different parameter ranges in an auditor’s absence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005091186
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102089