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Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the information structure determines aggregate volatility. We show that the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817221

Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come From?

Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We analyze a class of games with interdependent values and linear best responses. The payoff uncertainty is described by a multivariate normal distribution that includes the pure common and pure private value environment as special cases. We characterize the set of joint distributions over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895692

Information and Volatility

Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938545

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. The set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium for some information structure is equal to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686938

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686940

Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals

Renault, Jérôme; Tomala, Tristan - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004

The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708402

The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching

Lamping, Jennifer - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

optimal for the seller to do away with any matching considerations and allocate the contract on the basis of price alone. If … matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal mechanism may be implemented without commitment. However, if … matching is not sufficiently important, the seller suffers a loss when he is unable to commit. The magnitude of this loss …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490104

Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller

Lamping, Jennifer - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However … depresses bids. The more matching matters, the greater the penalty associated with observing the matches. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532170

Coordination in Sender-Receiver Games with no Common Language.

Fevrier, Ph.; Kramarz, F. - 2000

In this article, we study the emergence of coordination in repeated Sender-Receiver games with common interests when the messages have no common meaning before the game starts. We define axiomatic interpretation rules of the histories and study the resulting language-free signaling equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005641145

Equilibrium Selection under Different Learning Modes in Supermodular Games.

Kaarboe, O.M.; Tieman, A.F. - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 1999

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionary literature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simple behavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783558