emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … that would help prevent potential crises. We provide evidence of the relevance of this reputation mechanism. …

Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these …

emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … that would help prevent potential crises. We provide evidence of the relevance of this reputation mechanism. …

emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … that would help prevent potential crises. We provide evidence of the relevance of this reputation mechanism. …

How does the central bank's incentive to build a reputation affect speculators' ability to coordinate and the …' coordination and the central bank's reputation building? I address these questions in a dynamic regime change game that highlights … the interaction between the central bank's reputation building and speculators' individual learning. On the one hand, the …

the quality of securitized loans. In this theoretical model, I show that, in general, by providing reputation …