We study mechanism design in a setting where agents know their types but are uncertain about the utility from any alternative. The lnal realized utility of each agent is observed by the principal and can be contracted upon. In such environments, the principal is not restricted to using only...

How does information on environmental risks obtained by individuals in developing countries affect environmental quality? The literature reveals that for issues like water quality and pesticides, information affects individual behavior and risks are reduced through individual action. However,...

Biomass burning of agricultural field residue (stalks and stubble) during wheat and rice harvesting periods in the Indo-Gangetic plains has led to substantial emission of trace gases and particles. This paper seeks to address the regulation of emissions from open field burning of rice residue in...

The public goods problem (Hardin, 1968) either viewed as a problem of extraction or that of contribution has had a long history in the Social Sciences. Our experimental design uses a standard Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) game with a moderately large group of ten and face-to-face...