Showing 1 - 10 of 32,811
In our model, informed players decide whether or not to disclose, and observers allocate attention among disclosed signals, and toward reasoning through the implications of a failure to disclose. In equilibrium disclosure is incomplete, and observers are unrealistically optimistic. Nevertheless,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407521
This article relates interim financial reporting frequency in a multiperiod Kyle framework to securities prices, trading volume, market liquidity, and analysts' information acquisition expenditures. The model supports conventional wisdom that more frequent interim reporting improves the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012785972
We investigate truth-telling by an informed insider, or manager, who repeatedly forecasts cash flows to competitive investors in a standard message game. The insider may not trade on or sell private information, but receives wages that can depend on the current stock price or forecast accuracy....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012712156
The paper analyzes the strategic waiting tendencies of IPO firms. Our model shows why some high-quality firms may strategically delay their initial public offering until a favorable signal about the economic conditions is generated by other issuing firms. Survival analysis suggests that IPOs in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012756226
This paper explores the possibility of endogenous segmentation in a market where information asymmetry about the quality of goods may result in only low-quality goods trading (lemons problem). I consider a model in which there are multiple ex ante identical submarkets, agents costlessly choose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720123
We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851330
game theory model to examine the impact of different communication protocols on China's incentives to reveal information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010875321
In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884477
As online information availability for products and services is increasing and as buyers engage in more online search prior to purchase decisions, it is becoming more important for firms to know when to invest to reduce buyer uncertainty. This article argues that today's firms should view...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905465
We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906368