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The constitution of economic growth: Testing the prosperity effects of a Madisonian model on a panel of countries 1980‐2000

Justesen, Mogens K.; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

Political scientists and economists increasingly agree that institutions may influence economic growth, but there is little general agreement on what institutions tend to produce what consequences. We apply public choice insights for a theoretical analysis that may be termed “Madisonian”:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421987

Coalitional Provision of Pure Collective Goods

Gilles, R.P. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090944

Strategic extremism

Appelbaum, Elie - Department of Economics, York University - 2006

of extremism decreases with wealth, power, and degree of democracy, but increases with the stakes in the conflict and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556680

Bribing Voters

Bo, Ernesto Dal - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

, and payoff and information structures. We discuss implications for the efficiency of democracy, voting, lobbying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604871

Bribing Voters.

Dal Bo, E. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

, and payoff and information structures. We discuss implications for the efficiency of democracy, voting, lobbying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051078

Should the Democratic Model Be Applied to Non-governmental Organizations and Firms ?

Salin, Pascal - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706558

Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces

Mishra, Debasis; Pramanik, Anup; Roy, Souvik - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 103-116

We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930783

The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation

Baliga, Sandeep - In: Review of Economic Design 7 (2002) 1, pp. 17-26

implementation of the organization's objectives. We show that the introduction of a professional monitor (e.g. auditor, regulator …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370566

Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier; Holden, Richard - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 284-290

We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738055

Implementation in multidimensional domains with ordinal restrictions

Mishra, Debasis; Pramanik, Anup; Roy, Souvik - Indian Statistical Institute - 2013

We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values … and sufficient for implementation and every locally incentive compatible mechanism is incentive compatible. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706362

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