Theory suggests that debt financing, relative to equity financing, makes managers reluctant to part with assets. Our evidence supports this theoretical prediction, revealing that the reluctance to part with a debt financed asset causes two decision errors—(1) participants forego investments...

Prior research on the cross-country variation of accounting choices induced by managerial incentives to extract private benefits is limited in its use of accounting measures that have limited empirical correlations with direct estimates of private control benefits. This study attempts to resolve...

This study examines whether differential interpretation of earnings announcements is affected by earnings and firm characteristics. We find that Kandel and Pearson's (1995) forecast measures of differential interpretation are: 1) negatively related to earnings predictability, firm size, and...

We show that the agency theory of overvalued equity (see Jensen, 2005) rather than investors' fixation on accruals explains the accrual anomaly, i.e., abnormal returns to an accrual trading strategy (see Sloan, 1996).Under the agency theory of overvalued equity, managers of overvalued firms are...

This paper examines the operating performance of UK firms following a decision to sell off non-financial assets as part of a new or ongoing restructuring program. We report that asset sales normally follow a sustained period of poor operating performance, and tend to occur in well-diversified...

This paper examines the ex post and ex ante benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers in the debt contracting process. I expect conservatism to benefit lenders ex post through the timely signaling of default risk, as manifested by accelerated covenant violations, and to...

We examine the relation between a broad set of corporate governance indicators and various measures of managerial decision making and organizational performance. Using a sample of 2,106 firms, we distill 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock...

This Article analyzes an important form of stealth compensation provided to managers of public companies. We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amounts of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments. Our study illustrates the significant role that...

This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers...

In this paper we provide evidence on analyst activity and performance in 47 countries around the world, including several emerging market economies. Our empirical analysis first demonstrates wide variation in the extent and accuracy of analyst activity across our sample countries. A handful of...