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Since the introduction of a formal commitments procedure in EU an- titrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive practices. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement (Be- bchuk, 1984; Shavell,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011246329
basis of the economic theory of law enforcement we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633331
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790
We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps to deter illegal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229
regulation or extended liability. Criminal sanctions, in the form of imprisonment, certainly bring benefits (and costs) in terms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136460
The article makes a literature review on the theory of Leniency Programs for cartels prosecution. We focus on how these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005009886
In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010659952
In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084408
In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010696482
Forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. We study the consequences of leniency – reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers – on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785844