Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook result in one-sided markets is that a government may increase a...

Newspapers are two-sided platforms that sell their product both to readers and advertisers. Media firms in general, and newspapers in particular, are considered important providers of information, culture and language in most countries. Newspapers are therefore given preferential tax treatment....

The analysis of economies of specialization at the individual level by Yang & Shi (1992) and Yang & Ng (1993) is combined with the Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) analysis of monopolistic-competitive firms to show that, ignoring administrative costs and indirect effects (such as rent-seeking), even if...

In this paper we claim that the disadvantage in the pollution control is not primarily the accumulated stock of pollutants, which is an accomplished fact, but the use of the available inputs in production in conjunction with the available equipment are the sources of pollutants accumulation. In...

The paper shows how the differing incidence of specific and ad valorem taxation in imperfectly competitive markest can be exploited to control international oligopoly. If countries act cooperatively, the tax instruments used in combination achieve the same outcome, either the first-best or the...

We analyse the incidence of ad valorem and unit excise taxes in an oligopolistic industry with diffentiated products and price-setting (Bertrand) firms.

This paper considers the relative efficiency of ad valorem and unit selective sales taxes in imperfectly competitive market. We provide a simple proof of the proposition that ad valorem taxes are welfare-superior to unit taxes in the short run whenproduction costs are identical across firms.

This paper analyzes the effects of specific and ad valorem taxation in an industry with downstream and upstream oligopoly. We find that in the short run, i.e. when the number of firms in both markets is exogenous, the results concerning tax incidence tend to be qualitatively similar to models...

This paper analyzes a class of two-stage Cournot games where firms are collusive in the first stage, and shows that oligopolists may have a strong incentive to redistribute resources (such as capital, pollution permits etc...) within the industry as a means of coordinating their output decision....

This paper analyzes the problem of altering the cost structure within an oligopoly, in the presence of costs of manipulation. Oligopolistic firms (which differ from each other in production costs) compete a la Cournot in the second stage, taking as given firm-specific taxees or input prices. In...