In this paper, one of the basic assumptions is that the environment provides two different kinds of services. First, the environment may serve as an input to the production of conventional goods. For example, the exploitation of an oil source from which one firm extracts the oil which in turn is...

In this paper we model the conflict between the group of polluting firms of a country and the social planer of the same country which attempts to control the volume of emissions generated during the production process. Both players of the game have their own control policies which are the rate...

In this paper, the basic assumption is that the environment provides two different kinds of services. First, the environment may serve as an input to the production of conventional goods. For example, the exploitation of an oil source from which one firm extracts the oil which in turn is used as...

Patent licensing agreements among competing firms usually involve royalties which are often considered to be anticompetitive as they raise market prices. In this paper we propose simple tax policies than can alleviate the effect of royalties. Considering a Cournot duopoly where firms produce...

This paper examines the economic rationales and conditions for the emer - gence of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Promoting production efficiency is not sufficient to justify the emergence of an MNE. With taxes in the model, tax authorities heavily tax an MNE’s economic activities, in which...

Based on product homogeneity and Cournot competition, a recurrent finding in the literature is that ad valorem taxation is welfare superior to unit taxation in noncompetitive markets. This paper first observes that with asymmetric costs inefficient firms are more likely to be inactive in...

Emission taxes under oligopoly with both fixed number and endogenous market structure (perhaps the most relevant market structures for policy issues) are examined. In the latter case, and contrary to what is expected under imperfect competition, the optimal tax could exceed marginal external...

This paper analyzes a class of two-stage Cournot games where firms are collusive in the first stage, and shows that oligopolists may have a strong incentive to redistribute resources (such as capital, pollution permits etc...) within the industry as a means of coordinating their output decision....

This paper analyzes the problem of altering the cost structure within an oligopoly, in the presence of costs of manipulation. Oligopolistic firms (which differ from each other in production costs) compete a la Cournot in the second stage, taking as given firm-specific taxees or input prices. In...

This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey (1927) and Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)) to a competitive economy in which some markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. As in most insurance markets, consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but …firms...