This paper examines the contracting and negotiation process in mergers using an incomplete contracts framework. Our multi-period model allows for the arrival of new information and renegotiation subsequent to the signing of an initial merger agreement but prior to deal completion or termination....

We examine contracts used in mergers from the announcement of initial definitive agreement to the completion or termination of the deal, and the renegotiation process in between. We build a model that allows for renegotiation following the arrival of new information, and demonstrate that a...

Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs...

This paper analyzes situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not realized according to plan. If the project is expedited, a reward arises. Analogously, a penalty arises if the project is delayed. This paper considers the case of arbitrary monotonic reward and penalty...

We examine merger activity and its effect on asset pricing in a firm network economy. Mergers create internal capital markets which change the cash flow risk structure of the merging firms. We propose a solution concept for coalitional games without the superadditivity axiom, which extends the...

The paper develops a model of optimal auditing behavior when the economic environment adds a noise term to the firm's cash flows, which can be reduced by employing an external auditor. The paper connects the optimal auditing policy and (i) share prices of the firm and (ii) auditor's...

One of the most complex problem in contemporary game theory is a solution of n-person games with cooperation between players. Sixty years of research bring us many different ideas in the form of vector of payoffs to all players: von Neumann - Morgenstern solution, core (Gillies), Shapley value,...

The lexicographic vectors of a balanced game, called here leximals, are used to define a new solution concept, the lexicore, on the cone of balanced games. Properties of the lexicore and its relation with the core on some classes of games are studied. It is shown that on cones of balanced games...

In this paper, we examine the question of which coalition structures farsighted players form in coalition formation games with externalities. We introduce a stability concept for a coalition structure called a sequentially stable coalition structure. Our concept of domination between two...

Attribution of economic joint effects is achieved with a random order model of their relative importance. Random order consistency and elementary axioms uniquely identify linear and proportional marginal attribution. These are the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999, 2002) and Ortmann...