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This dissertation includes two essays on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in reinsurance markets. The first essay builds a competitive principal-agent model that considers adverse selection and moral hazard jointly, and characterizes graphically various forms of separating Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009463429
Market based instruments are proving increasingly effective in biodiversity procurement and in regulatory schemes to preserve biodiversity. The design of these policy instruments brings together issues in auction design, contract theory, biology, and monitoring technology. Using a mixed adverse...
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The working paper presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating both moral hazard and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008685255
When Insurers Go Bust applies agency theory and the theories of adverse selection and moral hazard as the motivation for prudential regulation of insurance. The resulting scheme has strong flavors of verifiability, simplicity, consistency, and transparency. In consequence, ruin theory does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005268655
We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986443
A unilateral policy intervention by a country (such as the introduction of an emission price) can induce firms to relocate to other countries. We analyze a dynamic game where a regulator offers contracts to avert relocation of a firm in each of two periods. The firm can undertake a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929704
In this paper we solve a parametric moral hazard model that incorporates risk and inequity aversion. In the model, the worker's effort is not contractible but the employer can link the worker's compensation to the revenue, a measure probabilistically related to the effort. The model can account...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278788