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workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases … quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can be improved with sufficient monitoring. "Committed" workers also produce … results thus show how a firm can refine its worker selection and monitoring options together with the payment system to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010700365
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703754
such as monitoring, but also through agents intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and … to potential returns. When monitoring becomes relatively cheaper over time, agents acquire lower trustworthiness, which … choosing governance methods tend to have higher monitoring intensities and lower trust. These results are consistent with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005006775
(VF)Le système d’évaluation des performances dans le secteur bancaire est encore peu étudié en France. Il existe peu d’informations sur l’Architecture Organisationnelle des banques de réseaux qui aujourd’hui, se targuent de pouvoir compter sur de solides réseaux bancaires pour...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991535
This article studies how a firm fosters formal and informal interaction among its employees to create a collective identity and positively influence their effort. We develop an agency model, in which employees have both a personal and a social ideal for effort. The firm does not observe the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004041
In this article, we propose to view the firm as a locus of socialization in which employees with heterogeneous work attitudes can be motivated and coordinated through adherence to a social ideal of effort. We develop an agency model in which employees have both a personal and a social ideal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210986
We develop a model in which the principal and the agent share private information about the value of the agent for a multi-agent organization. The principal can disclose private information and make public the relative standing or status of all agents in the organization. We study whether it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261610
This article studies how a firm fosters formal and informal interaction among its employees to create a collective identity and positively influence their effort. We develop an agency model, in which employees have both a personal and a social ideal for effort. The firm does not observe the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010754873
We study the effect of leadership on incentive contracts in a moral-hazard framework. In our model, agents are allowed to choose the timing of their actions. The agents may choose their effort levels simultaneously or sequentially. We show that relative performance evaluation leads to a subgame...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576929
What determines firm growth over the life-cycle? Exploiting unique firm panel data on internal organization, balance sheets and innovation, representative of the entire Canadian economy, we study recent theories that examine life-cycle patterns for firm growth. These theories include...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951103