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Implemented widely in the area of corporate finance, Hamada’s Equation enables one to separate the financial risk of a levered firm from its business risk. The relationship, which results from combining the Modigliani-Miller capital structuring theorems with the Capital Asset Pricing Model, is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837485
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This paper reports estimates of the long-run costs and benefits of banks funding more of their assets with loss-absorbing capital, or equity. Measuring those costs requires careful consideration of a wide range of issues about how shifts in funding affect required rates of return and on how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318447
This paper reports estimates of the long-run costs and benefits of banks funding more of their assets with loss-absorbing capital, or equity. Measuring those costs requires careful consideration of a wide range of issues about how shifts in funding affect required rates of return and on how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008915802
We examine the validity of a macroeconomic version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. For this purpose, we develop a general equilibrium model with two production sectors, risk-averse households and financial intermediation by banks. Banks are funded by deposits and (outside) equity and monitor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084423
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returns. We address this question in an experiment where single traders have different information levels about an asset …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765185
Kariv [9] and is based on the theory of Çelen and Kariv [10]. We find that imitation is much less frequent when subjects … have imperfect information, even less frequent than the theory predicts. Further, while we find strong evidence that under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753117
The paper presents an experimental study of truth telling and trust in communication under asymmetric information. In a two-player Communication Game (cf., Gneezy, 2005), an informed “advisor” sends a message to an uninformed “decision maker”, who then has to decide whether to follow the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005642409