In a simple exchange economy we propose a bargaining procedure that leads to a Walrasian outcome as the agents become increasingly patient. The competitive outcome therefore obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final...

We investigate the role of complementarities in production and skill mobility across cities. We propose a general equilibrium model of location choice by heterogeneously skilled workers, and consider different degrees of complementarities between the skills of workers. The nature of the...

Jan Eeckhout is a Professor of Economics at University College London and at Barcelona GSE/UPF. Eeckhout's research has been concerned with labor markets, matching and sorting. Philipp Kircher is a Reader of Economics at the London School of Economics. Kircher's research has been concerned with...

Because of sorting, more skilled workers are more productive in higher type firms. They also learn at different rates about their productivity and therefore expect different wage paths across firms. We show that under strict supermodularity there is always Positive Assortative Matching:...

It is well known that a monopolist selling a single good, say a painting, can extract higher rents running an auction-type mechanism rather than posting a fixed price. In competitive markets, for example selling used books on line, price posting is often more prevalent than auctions. While...