The popular, demagogic narrative after the global financial system's collapse in 2008 has held that the financial crisis signalled the failure of capitalism. However, regulators across the world must realize that the financial crisis was not brought about by the failure of markets but by the...

Do legal institutions governing financial contracts affect the nature of real investments in the economy? We develop a simple model and provide evidence that the answer to this question is yes. We consider a levered firm's choice of investment between innovative and conservative technologies, on...

Can stringent labor laws be efficient? Possibly, if they provide firms with a commitment device to not punish short-run failures and thereby incentivize the pursuit of value-maximizing innovative activities. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence that strong labor laws indeed appear to...

We develop a theory to show how external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control, and internal governance mechanisms interact to affect innovation by firms. Our model generates the novel testable implication that there is a non-monotonic U-shaped relation...

We investigate Project Finance as a private response to inefficiencies created by weak legal protection of outside investors. We offer a new illustration that law matters by demonstrating that for large investment projects, Project Finance provides a contractual and organizational substitute for...

We argue that when bankruptcy code is creditor-friendly, excessive liquidationscause levered firms to shun innovation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure,a debtor-friendly code induces greater innovation. We provide empirical support for thisclaim by employing patents as a proxy for...

We provide empirical evidence that strong dismissal laws appear to have a positive effect on the innovative pursuits of firms and their employees. Stringent labor laws provide firms a commitment device to not punish short-run failures and thereby spur their employees to pursue value-enhancing...

We argue that when bankruptcy code is creditor-friendly, excessive liquidations cause levered firms to shun innovation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtor-friendly code induces greater innovation. We provide empirical support for this claim by employing patents as a proxy...