Analyzing a large panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through ownership of cash flow rights mitigate such behavior. These findings do not seem to...

Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees...

Theories of taste-based discrimination predict that competitive pressures will drive discriminatory behavior out of the market. Using detailed matched employer-employee data, we analyze how firm takeovers and product market competition affect firms' gender composition and gender wage gap. Taking...

Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees...

Analyzing a large panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers’ pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through ownership of cash flow rights mitigate such behaviour. These findings do not seem...

We present evidence on whether managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay, using a large panel dataset that matches public firms with detailed data on their subsidiaries and workers. We find that CEOs with a stronger grip on control pay their workers higher wages, but CEO ownership of cash...

We present evidence on whether managerial entrenchment affects workers’ pay, using a large panel dataset that matches public firms with detailed data on their subsidiaries and workers. We find that CEOs with a stronger grip on control pay their workers higher wages, but CEO ownership of cash...

Analyzing a large panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through ownership of cash flow rights mitigate such behavior. These findings do not seem to...