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Delay in Fiscal Reform
Katayama, Kentaro - East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER) - 2008
This paper analyzes the political economy of delayed agreement over fiscal reforms, in a setting where two interest groups can bargain over the allocation of the cost of the stabilization. This contrasts with the classic contribution of Alesina and Drazen, who assume that a group which concedes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009365362
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Bargaining Power and Majoritarian Allocations
McCain, McCain , Roger - LeBow College of Business, Drexel University - 2013
It seems that decisions in many voting bodies might be described by a two-stage decision in which the first stage is a … bargaining process and the second is a vote that is often a formality. This does not mean that the voting is irrelevant, but … groups have none. This paper uses a recent extension of bargaining theory that attributes bargaining power to groups as well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010841125
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Government corruption and legislative procedures: is one chamber better than two?
Testa, Cecilia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003
This paper studies the impact of the competition between lobbies and voters on policy outcomes under alternative legislative procedures. Lobbies and citizens have opposing interests in a public policy and offer money and votes, respectively, to legislators to obtain their preferred policy....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928625
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On the optimality of bargaining outcomes in the Collective-Particularistic multilateral bargaining game
Cardona, Daniel; Rubí-Barceló, Antoni - Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Facultat de Ciències … - 2013
This note analyzes the efficiency properties of the equilibrium in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides a budget among collective and particularistic goods. We extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (2007) by considering smooth utility functions and consensus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835346
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Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Public Investment
Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R. - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2010
We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the planner's optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008503149
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Conflict Resolution Under Asymmetric Information
Bester, Helmut; Wärneryd, Karl - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1998
We consider Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. We model the default option of outright conflict as a probabilistic contest. Examples of such contests may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423852
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Demand bargaining in legislatures
Cardona-Coll, Daniel; Mancera, Francisco M. - In: Economic Theory 16 (2000) 1, pp. 163-180
We analyze a pure bargaining problem when decisions require simple majority and self interested players make unilateral demands. In contrast to the case where proposals consist of complete sharing profiles, this content of proposals prevents implicit side-payments inside the committee, and so...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370657
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POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION
GARRATT, ROD; PARCO, JAMES E.; QIN, CHENG-ZHONG; … - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 07 (2005) 04, pp. 407-429
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in … prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent … elimination of weakly dominated strategies and strong/coalition-proof Nash equilibrium are also tested. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977746
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Reference Dependent Altruism
Breitmoser, Yves; Tan, Jonathan H.W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
In view of behavioral patterns left unorganized by current social preference theories, we propose a theory of reference … effects that are conditional on whether or not payoffs meet reference points. We verify the theory first by experimentally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110657
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Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining
Vanberg, Christoph; Moya, Miller; Miguel, Luis - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico … - 2014
the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011168521