This paper shows how strategic matching generates reputation-building behavior in an evolutionary chain-store game. Strategic matching means the possibility for an entrant to choose in a strategic way the local market into which it will move. Players are boundedly rational and follow behavioral...

We investigate aspects of institutional change in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework, in principle focusing on problems of coordination in groups when new solutions to a problem become available. In an evolutionary game with an underlying dilemma structure, we let a number of new...

We study 4 x 4 games for which the best response dynamics contain a cycle. We give examples in which multiple Shapley polygons occur for these kinds of games. We derive conditions under which Shapley polygons exist and conditions for the stability of these polygons. It turns out that there is a...

Adaptive dynamics is a mathematical framework for studying evolution. It extends evolutionary game theory to account for more realistic ecological dynamics and it can incorporate both frequency- and density-dependent selection. This is a practical guide to adaptive dynamics that aims to...

This paper studies a repeated play of a family of games by resource-constrained players. To economize on reasoning resources, the family of games is partitioned into subsets of games which players do not distinguish. An example is constructed to show that when games are played a finite number of...

Prompted by a real-life observation in the UK retail market, a two-player Prisoners’ Dilemma model of an alliance between two firms is adapted to include the response of a rival firm, resulting in a version of a three-player Prisoners’ Dilemma. We use this to analyse the impact on the...

Costly signaling is a mechanism through which the honesty of signals can be secured in equilibrium, even in interactions where communicators have conflicting interests. This paper explores the dynamics of one such signaling game: Spence’s model of education. It is found that separating...

The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type:...

We numerically solve the classical "Game of Pure Strategy" using linear programming. We notice an intricate even-odd behaviour in the results of our computations that seems to encourage odd or maximal bids.

Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and...