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Trust and Arena Size. Expectations, Trust, and Institutions Co-Evolving, and Their Critical Population and Group Sizes.

Elsner, Wolfram; Schwardt, Henning - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We develop a formal approach to the emergence of institutionalized trust in the context of the evolution of cooperation … the emergence of institutionalized cooperation in an arena, or population. Critical levels of expectations (to meet a … cooperation has been established as the prevalent behavioral pattern in a number of platforms, its habituation as an institution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259863

Crime, Punishment, and Evolution in an Adversarial Game

McBride, Michael; Kendall, Ryan; Short, Martin B.; … - Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine - 2012

coordination game. We provide policy implications and lessons learned about the evolution of cooperation more generally. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959973

Coordination in the El Farol Bar problem: The role of social preferences and social networks

Chen, Shu-Heng; Gostoli, Umberto - Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) - 2013

In this paper, the authors continue the pursuit of the self-coordination mechanism as studied in the El Farol Bar problem. However, in addition to efficiency (the optimal use of the public facility), they are also interested in the distribution of the public resources among all agents. Hence,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956095

An adaptive evolutionary behaviour for the demand-led growth adjustment

Bonaventura, Luigi; Caserta, Maurizio - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

Investment activity produces effects on two different economic variables. On the one hand, it adds to the existing productive capacity, on the other, it represents a component of demand. What is required for demand may not be required for accumulation, and viceversa. As a consequence different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260126

When do Formal Rules and Informal Norms Converge?

Desierto, Desiree A.; Nye, John V. C. - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 167 (2011) 4, pp. 613-629

We propose evolutionary dynamics to show how rules converge into norms. Individuals play a game of upholding or rejecting a rule, and the more they uphold the rule, the more it becomes established as a norm. We find that when individuals are rational, the initial state determines whether the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421919

The role of fairness motives and spatial considerations in explaining departures from Nash equilibrium: stationary and evolutionary lessons from 2x2 games

Tavoni, Alessandro - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837064

Evolutionary Modelling in Economics: A Survey of Methods and Building Blocks

Safarzynska, Karolina; Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. van den - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2008

In this paper we present an overview of methods and components of formal economic models employing evolutionary approaches. This compromises two levels: (1) techniques of evolutionary modelling, including multi-agent modelling, evolutionary algorithms and evolutionary game theory; (2) building...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588059

Policy Instruments for Evolution of Bounded Rationality: Application to Climate-Energy Problems

Nannen, Volker; den Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M. van - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We demonstrate how an evolutionary agent-based model can be used to evaluate climate policies that take the heterogeneity of strategies of individual agents into account. An essential feature of the model is that the fitness of an economic strategy is determined by the relative welfare of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005616685

Evolution as a general theoretical framework for economics and public policy

Wilson, David Sloan; Gowdy, John M. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 90 (2013) S, pp. 3-3

Economic and evolutionary thinking have been entwined throughout their histories, but evolutionary theory does not function as a general theoretical framework for economics and public policy, as it does for the biological sciences. In this lead article for a special issue of the Journal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678972

Evolution of cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas

Janssen, Marco A.; Rollins, Nathan D. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012) 1, pp. 220-229

cooperation in asymmetric dilemmas can evolve and persist when the agents contend with other social dilemmas than the asymmetric …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597463

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