We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer informationabout past purchase history in a situation where firms are uncertainabout whether a particular consumer considers the product offeringscomplements or substitutes. By addressing this new type ofbehavior-based price...

We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer informationabout past purchase history in a situation where firms are uncertainabout whether a particular consumer considers the product offeringscomplements or substitutes. By addressing this new type ofbehavior-based price...

This paper analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation oninvestment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and contentproviders (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. We show thatthe ISP s decision on the introduction of discrimination across contentdepends on a...

This paper provides a new perspective on the validity of the so called "leverage theory". In a model of preemptive innovation in "systems" markets, I examine the effect of bundling on R&D incentives/. I find that bundiling provides a channel through which monopoly "slack" in one component market...

This paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship that is susceptible to the moral hazard problem. The optimal contractual form of licensing derived in the model generates predictions that seem to be consistent with actual practice. For instance, the introduction of...

This paper analyzes a technology adoption process in which the effect of informational spillover interacts with network externalities. It is shown that the interplay of informational externalities and payoff interdependency induces risk averse and clustering behavior in the technology adoption...

One of the most enduring controversies in antitrust concerns the potential foreclosure effects of vertical integration. In a recent paper, Ordover, Saloner and Saloner and Salop (1990) construct a model of vertical integration in which vertical foreclosure emerges as the equilibrium outcome....

This paper provides a simple model of repeated extortion. In particular, we ask whether corrupt government officials' ex post opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations. We show that the inability of government...

Borrowers' reputation concerns makes communication of soft or non-verifiable information credible. We find that some misreporting of short-term information has costs as well as benefits. The costs are due to inefficient management of investments, while the benefits are due to the fact that some...