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This paper investigates core stability of cooperative (TU) games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of … a cooperative game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to … reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366450
Core elements (a la Aubin) of a fuzzy game can be associated with additive separable supporting functions of fuzzy … and studied. While the Aubin core of unanimity games can be empty, the generalized core of unanimity games is nonempty … are found such as the fact that the generalized core is a unique generalized stable set. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047560
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allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost … consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a nonempty core for any vector of revenues if, and only … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011097704
This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitionsâ€) deliberately get together to jointly determine within-group actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255412
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255790
This paper associates a strategic <I>n</I>-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...</i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144450
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