Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe — about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the...

Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement — that is, the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide...

Game-theoretic analysis often leads to consideration of an infinite hierarchy of beliefs for each player. Harsanyi suggested that such a hierarchy of beliefs could be summarized in a single entity, called the player's type. This chapter provides an elementary construction, complementary to the...

Best-response sets (Pearce [1984]) characterize the epistemic condition of “rationality and common belief of rationality.” When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008])...

Two properties of preferences and representations for choice under uncertainty which play an important role in decision theory are: (i) admissibility, the requirement that weakly dominated actions should not be chosen; and (ii) the existence of well defined conditional probabilities, that is,...

Correlations arise naturally in noncooperative games, e.g., in the equivalence between undominated and optimal strategies in games with more than two players. But the noncooperative assumption is that players do not coordinate their strategy choices, so where do these correlations come from? The...