When the asset market is incomplete, competitive equilibria are constrained suboptimal, which provides a scope for pareto improving interventions. Price regulation can be such a pareto improving policy, even when the welfare effects of rationing are taken into account. An appealing aspect of...

In an economy with a non-atomic measure space of assets and exchangeable risks, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) holds exactly; and factors are structurally specified, which allows for an economic interpretation.

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state -contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex-ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibria allocation can be viewed...

In an economy with asymmetric information, Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) need not become asymptotically incentive compatible, even if many independent replicas of the economy are merged together. We identify a sub-class of REE for which this is nevertheless the case. It consists of...

In an economy with a non-atomic measure space of assets and exchangeable risks, the Arbitrage pricing Theory (APT) holds exactly; and factors are structurally specified, which allows for an economic interpretation.

If the allocation of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state - contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...

Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information, Nash-Walras equilibria...

In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile of...